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ABSTRACT 
Leslie Ann Beasley: Explaining Variations in Environmental Performance across 17 Industrial 
Democracies 
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens) 
 
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the economic and political literature on 
(solutions to) environmental pollution issues by indentifying the variables which 
significantly affect environmental performance. This thesis revisits the socioeconomic, 
political, and institutional variables that studies of the period in which environmental 
mobilization was first gaining momentum (1970-1990) report significant for affecting 
outcomes in environmental performance. It finds that the independent variables 
corporatism, geographic advantage, and income are significant in explaining variations in 
environmental performance across the 17 industrial democracies covered in this thesis.  
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Introduction 
International policy efforts such as the Kyoto protocol and the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development reflect how environmental issues such as air pollution and even access to fresh water 
require the attention and cooperation of the entire global community. They also reflect the vital role 
of developed industrialized democracies in influencing the amount and type of attention given to 
environmental issues worldwide. And yet, as evidenced by the poorer environmental performance 
of influential leaders such as the United States, policy efforts, even at a global level, and rhetorical 
commitments to leadership in areas such as climate change and pollution, do not necessarily dictate 
improvements in environmental performance. As important at it is for leaders in industrialized 
countries such as the United States and across Europe to take a strong, leading position on climate 
change, energy security, and other environmental issues, it is equally as important for these leaders 
to be aware of what factors cause cross-sectional differences in environmental performance. 
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the economic and political literature on (solutions 
to) environmental pollution issues by identifying the variables which significantly affect 
environmental performance. This thesis revisits the socioeconomic, political, and institutional 
variables that studies of the period in which environmental mobilization was first gaining 
momentum (1970-1990) report significant for affecting outcomes in environmental performance. It 
assesses whether these factors have remained significant over time or have lessened or shifted in 
significance due to certain social, economic, and political structural changes on the national and 
supranational levels. 
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The thesis is divided up into two main sections. The first section deals mainly with the 
construction of the dependent variable, environmental performance and testing for convergence in 
environmental performance among the countries in the study. The section discusses the 
operationalization of the dependent variable and the overall environmental performance of 
countries from 1970 to 2005. It then retests the following hypothesis, purported by Scruggs: 
“environmental performance is converging among advanced industrial countries as environmental 
attitudes and policies have diffused, and as countries have adopted similar standards and 
regulations” (2003: 23). Based on the above assumptions, one would expect to find convergence not 
only among industrialized countries in the last 10 to 15 years, but especially among countries of the 
European Union, due to growing harmonization of EU environmental policy. 
 The second part of the thesis is then devoted to (re)answering the question of what 
variables affect environmental performance, or reduction in environmental pollution, among the 
developed countries of the world. The section looks in particular at seven different economic, 
institutional, and political variables that other studies of comparative environmental performance 
have found useful for explaining variation in environmental performance such as income, land size, 
and corporatism.  It contains explanations of the construction of the independent variables in the 
study and the results of the regression analysis. It discusses the way the regression results may 
influence how we understand and explain the relationship between economic, institutional, and 
political variables and variations in environmental performance among industrialized countries. 
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1. Measuring Environmental Performance 
The environmental performance indicators used in this study are based directly on the 
indicators developed and used by Lyle Scruggs (2003) in Sustaining Abundance: Environmental 
performance in industrial democracies. This section of the thesis recaps why these particular 
indicators are relevant for creating the study’s dependent variable, environmental performance, as 
well as investigates whether or not there has been the expected convergence among the 17 
countries since 1995, especially among the member countries of the European Union.  
In order to more succinctly study environmental performance among 17 industrialized 
democracies, and to create a broad aggregate dependent variable (environmental performance), 
Scruggs identifies six pollution indicators “that have been identified as important across all industrial 
countries, thus making them candidates for remedial action by business, government, and the 
public” (2003: 21). They are: sulfur oxide emissions, nitrogen oxide emissions, creation and disposal 
of municipal waste, recycling rates, water pollution (measured by the percentage of the population 
served by wastewater treatment), and fertilizer usage.  
Each of the indicators included in this study and discussed below are derived from a set of 
key environmental indicators established by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development), and are meant to reflect environmental progress among the OECD member 
countries. The data for each environmental performance indicator is taken from the OECD 
Environmental Data Compendium (2005, 2007, and 2008) and the OECD Key Environmental 
Indicators 2008, with the exception of fertilizer usage which comes from the Food and Agriculture 
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Organization (FAO) and is based on calculations of commercial fertilizer usage per 10,000 hectare of 
arable land (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2006).  
Sulfur oxides are green house gases which are particularly harmful to human health and to 
the environment, in human beings they have been associated with lung, heart, and other respiratory 
disease (U.S. EPA 2008: “Sulfur Dioxide”). They have also been linked to acid rain and therefore vast 
ecosystem damage (U.S. EPA 2008: “Sulfer Dioxide”). The data for the SOx indicator is based on the 
change in the level of total SOx emissions from 1970 to 2005, taken directly from the OECD 
Environmental Data Compendium (2005, 2007). Nitrogen oxide emissions come primarily from on-
road vehicles and from fertilizer usage. They are also the result of electricity generation, fossil fuel 
combustion, industrial processes, and waste disposal (U.S. EPA 2008: “Nitrogen Oxides”). Nitrogen 
Oxides have considerable human health effects due primarily to ground-level Ozone (smog) and 
they contribute to “acid rain” and the green house effect, which is the leading cause of climate 
change (U.S. EPA 2008: “Nitrogen Oxides”). Furthermore, because they are emitted from fertilizer, 
they also cause ground water contamination and affect eco systems, “upsetting the chemical 
balance of nutrients used by aquatic plants and animals” (U.S. EPA 2008: “Nitrogen Oxides”). The 
NOx indicator is based on the percent change in total NOx emissions levels from 1980 to 2005 (OECD 
2005, 2007). 
Generation of municipal waste is environmentally costly on several levels. First of all, there 
is the initial cost of the creation of the waste, followed by the cost of the transportation of the 
waste, and in the end the costs of waste disposal. Of course waste disposal is the most problematic 
aspect, as the general means of waste disposal are landfills and burning of waste, both of which lead 
to the leakage of harmful chemicals and gases into soil, air, and water. National governments may 
take a number of different actions in attempting to
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These include promoting recycling of products, especially paper and glass, and using economic tools, 
such as “internalizing the costs of waste management into prices of consumer goods and of waste 
management services” to reduce overall consumption and waste generation (OECD 2008: 18). The 
indicator for municipal waste generation is the change in percentage of municipal waste generation 
per capita from 1975 to 2005 (OECD 2005, 2007).  
Aside from indicating a level of individual commitment to environmental improvement, 
recycling is generally important as an indicator because the overall environmental effects of waste 
generation are reduced when recycling practices are used. Because most municipal waste ends up in 
landfills, recycling can reduce the amount of waste that goes into landfills, thereby reducing gaseous 
emissions and chemical pollution of soil and ground water, and the need to find alternative burial 
sites. Furthermore, most recycling processes, while not free from energy costs, use significantly less 
energy than non-recycling waste disposal processes, as well as generation of new products rather 
then recycled products. For example, it takes significantly less energy to recycle paper than it does 
to create new paper from wood. This study combines the recycling rates per capita for paper and 
glass in order to measure the change in recycling from 1980 to 2000, or the most recent year with 
data available (OECD 2005, 2007).  
Waste water treatment is the OECD measurement of overall freshwater quality and level of 
pollution of aquatic ecosystems. The OECD measures access to waste water treatment in terms of 
access to primary, secondary, and tertiary treatments. I used the overall combined percentage of 
population with access to water treatment, which provides the highest amount of population with 
access to some sort of water treatment. It is important to note that water treatment causes its own 
forms of pollution in terms of “concentrated pollutants like nitrates, phosphates, or heavy metals” 
and, as Scruggs notes, is not a long-term solution to the problem of water pollution (2003: 42). It is 
6 
 
an important measure of environmental performance, however, because it reflects overall efforts to 
decrease negative effects on human beings related to environmental pollution problems.  Overall, 
the data show improvement in both the access to water treatment and overall quality of water, 
meaning that efforts to abate external causes of water pollution such as agricultural run off from 
animal waste and fertilizer, as well as from industrial chemicals have increased over time.  
Finally, fertilizer usage is used as a measure of land, water, and air pollution. While fertilizer 
usage has some crop benefits, such as resistance to spoiling and greater crop production, excessive 
fertilizer usage causes the run off of damaging chemicals, such as nitrogen into water sources, as 
well as the evaporation of these chemicals into the air. These chemicals have serious effects on 
human health as well as the health of land and aquatic ecosystems. Fertilizer usage is measured as 
the usage of commercial fertilizer per 10,000 hectare of arable land (FAO 2006). The indicator is the 
change in fertilizer usage from 1970 to the most recent year with available data, 2000-2005.  
For the purpose of a comparative study of scale such as this, it follows logically that one 
should focus more on change in pollution levels, rather than the levels themselves.  Comparing 
change over time helps point to overall trends in environmental performance and responsiveness of 
countries to environmental pressures, despite the fact that countries may start out or end up with 
very different levels of pollution.  For each of the above indicators, I have calculated the percent 
change from 1970 (or the earliest year with most complete data) and 2005. The percent change was 
then calculated into an equation which takes into account the score of the highest and lowest 
performer for each of the variables:  
Envn= ∑p[ (%reductionnp – lowest%reductionp )/(highest%reductionp – lowest%reductionp )*100]
1
 
                                                          
1
 Scruggs (2003): 49.  
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This equation is then used to calculate a score from 0 to 100 for each country for each individual 
pollutant, with the lowest performer scoring a 0 and the highest performer scoring 100. The total 
overall possible score for each country is between 0 and 600 (Scruggs 2003: 49).  To further level the 
playing field, per Scruggs, I combine the variables for paper recycling and glass recycling into one 
variable and calculate the percent change based on his formula [([ending%]-
[beginning%])*100]/(100-[beginning%]). This equation compensates for countries that would be 
“punished” by starting out with higher recycling rates based on a basic percent change calculation, 
and is also used to calculate the scores for waste water treatment.  
Summary of Performance 
Table 1.1 Environmental Performance Scores 1970-2005* 
Country Sox NOx Waste Recycling Water Treatment Fertilizer Total 
Austria 97 55 36 89 77 94 448 
Belgium 78 87 80 79 3 99** 327 
Canada 43 34 100 27 0 0 204 
Denmark 100 81 66 57 93 96 493 
Finland 80 88 93 100 31 89 481 
France 75 90 66 34 26 83 347 
Germany 76 92 72 94 45 94 473 
Ireland 16 18 0 9 57 49 149 
Italy 80 81 64 0 48 39 312 
Japan 77 37 94 54 35 84 381 
Netherlands 92 89 84 50 100 100 515 
Norway 78 49 73 92 54 83 429 
Spain 0 0 40 9 33 10 92 
Sweden 99 100 76 96 3 94 468 
Switzerland 77 96 73 87 89 95 517 
United Kingdom 86 82 73 16 69 69 395 
United States 10 75 84 13 40** 62 244 
Source: Own calculations based on Scruggs’ aggregate environmental performance equations (2003: 49), data from OECD 
2005, 2007 and FAO 2008. 
*Environmental performance scores are calculated as change from 1970 to 2005, or from the year at the outset of the 
period with the most complete data: Sox is calculated from 1970 to 2005, NOx is calculated from 1980 to 2005, Waste 
from 1975 to 2005, recycling from 1980 to 2000 (paper) and 2005 (glass), water treatment from 1980 to 2005, and 
fertilizer usage from 1970 to 2002.  
**Data for access to waste water treatment for the United States was not available after 1995, the score for the United 
States is based on the period 1970 to 1995 and taken from Scruggs 2003: 51; data for fertilizer usage for Belgium was not 
available after 1995, the score for Belgium is based on the period 1970 to 1995 and taken from Scruggs 2003: 51.  
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In general, most of the countries in the study experienced some progress and improvement 
in each of the six areas. In terms of reduction of SOx emissions, countries experienced significant 
improvement over time, with countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark 
experiencing change in emissions outputs of between 90 and 95% from 1970.
2
 Furthermore, no 
country experienced an increase in emissions or a significant downturn in performance. As opposed 
to SOx, progress in NOx emissions was mixed, with several countries actually experiencing an 
increase in emissions as recently as 2005 Austria and Spain, and Norway in 2000. In Spain and 
Ireland an increase in NOx emissions might be due to an increase in industrial growth in a period 
where industrial growth was declining in some of the more developed countries of the study. It may 
also reflect an increase in the number of the population able to afford vehicles, and an increase in 
the transport of goods due to higher demand, greater wealth, and diminished borders between EU 
member states. 
As expected there is not a clear indication of better performance overall among the 
countries in this study in terms of waste generation. As population increases and as wealth increases 
in certain countries consumption levels are bound to rise. However, controlled growth of waste 
generation is more evident across countries in this study, with very few countries (Spain, Ireland, 
and Denmark the exceptions) experiencing dramatic surges in waste generation. Furthermore, there 
was a significant increase in recycling from 1980 to 1995 and 1980 to 2000. There was more of a 
plateau or less distinctive recycling increase between 1995 and 2000; this may be primarily due to 
smaller amount of years considered, as well as the difficulty in attracting new members to recycling 
practices.  
                                                          
2
 The data is based on my own calculations of the percent change in pollution levels from 1970 to 2005 for SOx 
emissions. The exact numbers are Netherlands, 92.11%; Austria, 94.63%; Denmark, 96.17%; and Sweden, 
95.86%. The percentage change scores for each individual indicator were then used to calculate the 
environmental performance scores shown above in Table 1.1. The data for pollution levels in 1970 and 2005 
comes from the OECD Environmental Data Compendium (2005, 2007).  
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More population dense countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark scored highest in 
terms of access to waste water treatment, where as less population dense countries, or countries 
that are likely to have higher numbers of rural population such as Canada, Sweden, and the United 
States scored lowest.  Most countries, Sweden as the exception, experienced an increase over time 
in access to waste water treatment facilities, which is evidence of improvement in the water 
pollution area of environmental performance.  
In terms of reduction of fertilizer usage, the countries with the most reduction and 
therefore best performance were the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland. The 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland are all countries with considerably less land area than the 
worst performers, Canada and Spain, and significantly smaller agricultural sectors. Countries with 
larger agricultures such as France, Germany, and Ireland scored in the middle, with relative 
improvement over time, suggesting that there is overall evidence of success in reducing fertilizer 
usage, and not simply a correlation between less fertilizer usage among countries with smaller land 
area and agricultural sectors. 
Based on the overall comparative performance score, the countries that performed the very 
best between 1970 and 2005 were Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, and 
Finland. The countries that scored the highest in the sub-period between 1995 and 2005 were 
Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, and the UK. This is consistent with Scruggs’ 2003 
study, which found that the countries with the best aggregate environmental performance between 
1970 and 1995 were Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria. Similarly, in his 
1998 study based on a separate, but similar environmental performance aggregate, Jahn found that 
of the OECD countries in his study, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland,  and 
Switzerland had the “more positive environmental performance” (Jahn 1998: 113). On the other 
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hand, the countries that had comparatively low environmental performance include the United 
States, Ireland, Canada, and Spain. This remains consistent with Scruggs (2003), and Jahn (1998), 
who both place the USA, Canada, and Ireland at the bottom of their lists.
3
  
The overall highest score in environmental performance from 1970 to 2005 was 518 
(Switzerland), the overall lowest score was 92 (Spain) and the mean score was 371, with countries 
like Belgium, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom scoring nearest the middle (mean).  Overall, 
countries that score well in one area tended to score well in others and vice versa, with the 
exception of countries such as Belgium and Sweden that scored high in most areas, but low in terms 
of percentage of population with access to waste water treatment. In Sweden this might be due to a 
higher number of people living in rural areas. For example, the country that scored the best for 
waste water treatment, the Netherlands, has the highest population density of any of the countries 
in the study, where as Sweden, has much lower population density. Furthermore, Ireland and Spain 
scored extremely low in many areas, as did the United States and Canada. Ireland and Spain’s low 
comparative score between 1970 and 2005, however, is probably due to underdevelopment and 
later economic growth versus the low scores of the United States and Canada which are probably 
due to large industrial development and large land size.  
Convergence 
 Changes in policy internationally as well as changes in EU policy create the expectation that 
convergence in performance should be occurring among advanced industrial democracies, as well as 
countries of the European Union. However, the above scores for environmental performance 
suggest that there are significant differences between countries in terms of where they fall along 
                                                          
3
 Jahn does not include Spain in his 1998 study, however, Spain would be likely to have similar performance to 
Ireland due to the categorization of “less developed…but with very substantial rates of pollution increase” 
(113).  
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the environmental performance scale. This is somewhat counter productive to the assumption and 
argument that industrialized countries, as their policies become more harmonized, should be 
moving towards similar levels of environmental performance.  
 In order to test for overall convergence among the countries, rather than convergence 
among the individual indicators, I calculated both an overall score of change in pollution levels from 
1970 to 2005 as well as a total score for the levels of pollution at the outset of the period. The first 
score, total change from 1970 to 2005, is based on the sum of the country scores for each of the six 
individual indicators, and the results can be found above in Table 1.1. For the first score a high score 
indicates better environmental performance whereas a low score indicates poorer environmental 
performance. The second score is calculated individually for each of the six indicators based on their 
pollution level at the outset of the period. For nitrogen oxide and sulfur oxide emissions, the level of 
pollution at the beginning of the period is standardized by the population in the same year, to 
account for different levels of emissions due to different country sizes. Similarly, the data for 
percentage of the population with access to waste water treatment and percentage of population 
with recycling are reversed so that the numbers represent the percentage of the population that 
does not have access to waste water treatment, and likewise the percentage of the population that 
does not recycle. The data for each indicator is then scaled to 100, so that the country with the most 
pollution scores a maximum of 100 points, and the country with the least amount of pollution in a 
given indicator scores the lowest amount of points, theoretically 0. For the second score a low score 
indicates better performance. Therefore, a positive correlation between overall performance over 
time and performance at the outset of the period would indicate convergence among the countries, 
where as negative correlation would indicate divergence. Below is the table of country scores for 
levels of pollution at the outset of the period, 1970, or the year closest to 1970 with the most 
available data. 
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Table 1.2 Scaled Country Scores for Pollution Levels at the Outset of the Period 
Country SOx NOx Waste  Recycling Water Treatment Fertilizer Total 
Austria 22 31 34 83 73 32 276 
Belgium 35 46 56 84 88 68 377 
Canada 100 82 88 92 47 3 411 
Denmark 39 55 69 91  29 283 
Finland 38 63 80 86 46 24 336 
France 20 40 50 83 49 32 273 
Germany 16 34 61 80 31 47 269 
Ireland 17 25 32 100 100 41 316 
Italy 19 30 48 81 81 12 271 
Japan 16 14 70 67 81 45 293 
Netherlands 20 42 82 77 38 100 359 
Norway 15 47 79 97 77 32 347 
Spain 24 26 42 85 93 8 277 
Sweden 41 55 54 87 29 21 287 
Switzerland 6 28 68 73 38 51 263 
United Kingdom 41 45 60 90 29 35 300 
United States 45 100 100 95 41 11 291 
Source: Data from OECD 2005, 2007; FAO 2008; and own calculations 
Countries like Switzerland and the Netherlands who had the best performance in terms of 
change over time (scoring a 517 and 515 out of a possible 600 total score on environmental 
performance from 1970 to 2005), had moderate pollution levels at the outset of the period, shown 
above in Table 1.2.
4
 Italy also had low pollution levels, probably due to being less developed at this 
point and time than other countries such as the United States and Canada. Canada, notably, scores 
the worst (highest) at the outset of the period, and as one of the worst (lowest) in change in 
environmental performance over time, suggesting that it is not only plagued by high levels to begin 
with, but failure to make significant improvements over time.
 5
 
In terms of convergence, the graph below is a twoway scatter plot of the total score for 
pollution level at the outset of the period and the total score for changes in the level of pollution 
                                                          
4
 See Table 1.1, p. 6-7 
5
 ibid 
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over time.  The results do not indicate that there has been convergence among the countries during 
this period. Actually the negative correlation (-.28) and the graph suggest that there has been 
divergence among the countries. Even when the obvious outliers (Ireland and Spain) are removed, 
the graph continues to reflect divergence with a negative correlation (-.41).  
 
*total7005 is the aggregate score calculated based on percent change in pollution levels from 1970 to 2005; total score is 
the aggregate score calculate based on levels of pollution at the outset of the period, 1970.  
Figure 1.1 Total scores for pollution levels at the outset of the period and total scores for changes 
in pollution levels from 1970 to 2005.  
Convergence among EU member states 
While Scruggs and Jahn do not consider the impact of the European Union on 
environmental performance, for reasons which are particularly relevant to their studies, namely the 
time period in review, changes in European environmental policy 1995 onward, as well as evidence 
from studies by Armingeon (2008) and Knill and Lenschow (2005) suggest that there is significant 
merit to reviewing the influence of the European Union on the environmental performance of 
member states.  
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One of the most recent and notable EU environmental policy developments has been the EU 
Sustainable Development Strategy, which is the application of the open method of coordination, 
used by the EU in policy areas such as social inclusion and employment, to environmental areas. 
Using the open method of coordination, the sustainable development strategy aims to reach certain 
environmental goals by implementing the best practices of individual member states across the EU. 
However, within the sustainable development strategy there are policies which employ the usage of 
“hard law instruments” such as directives and penalties, which make countries responsible under EU 
law. Overall, however, the SDS is based upon “soft modes of governance (SMGs), such as the use of 
soft instruments for policy-goal setting, voluntary national action plans, non-binding measures, 
market-oriented instruments, stakeholder participation and network-led initiatives” (Usui 2007: 
620). For example, the EU supports using tax incentives to achieve positive sustainable outcomes 
and also to have an effect on the public’s behavior and response to environmental problems. The 
Swedish governments’ 2001 decision to “increase taxes on diesel, heating oil, and electricity and 
lower income taxes on social security contributions” is used by the EU as successful example for the 
type of effective environmental efforts member countries can (should) make (European Commission 
2007: 10). SDS, however, might be too recent to have a measureable effect on the data in this study 
having really only begun in 2001.  
The graph in Figure 1.2 below is a twoway scatter plot of the total scores for pollution levels 
at the outset of the period and the total scores for changes in pollution levels over time for EU 
member states only. The results do not indicate that there has been the expected convergence 
among the member states of the European Union during this period. Although the relationship is 
positive, the data suggests that there really is no correlation (.0914). Again, when the most obvious 
outliers (Spain and Ireland) are dropped from the data, the correlation becomes even less (.02) and 
the line becomes almost flat. Although there is not enough room in this thesis, it should be noted 
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that based on the qualitative evidence of harmonization of European environmental policy, there 
may be significant cause to investigate a smaller subset of the data, the more recent period 1995 to 
2005. This data may offer a stronger indication of convergence and actual changes that are 
happening over time, and may more strongly represent the influence of EU environmental policy, 
rather than the broader period 1970 to 2005 discussed here.  
 
Figure 1.2 Total scores for pollution levels at the outset of the period and total scores for changes 
in pollution levels from 1970 to 2005, EU member states only 
Developments in EU policy, as well as overall global developments, such as the ratification 
of the Kyoto protocol are legitimate reasons that one would expect convergence among EU member 
states and industrial democracies in general in terms of environmental performance. As for EU 
members, all countries agree to the same directives and are threatened by the same legal sanctions, 
and blaming and shaming. In spite of this, as the above graphs reflect, harmonized policy does not 
particular dictate harmonized outcomes. Due to the subsidiary principle, and the new Sustainable 
Development Strategy, many of the EU implementation strategies are based on uptake by national 
governments in ways that do not alter the current structure of their individual bureaucratic 
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institutions, so that each individual member state is typically responsible for interpreting and 
implementing EU environmental directives in whatever way they deem most appropriate, “national 
bureaucracies remain widely autonomous in finding appropriate ways towards policy compliance” 
(Knill and Lenschow 2005: 586). This then would be one reason not to expect convergence, even in 
light of strengthened EU policy, but rather a reason to look toward the independent variables in this 
study, such as corporatism and structure of political institutions to better understand the elements 
which facilitate better performance.  
While the EU may have geared up its policy making, the way in which its policies are put into 
place depends more on the institutional structure of the particular nation state, “in line with 
institutional arguments, we expect the strongest convergence between countries characterized by 
similar state, legal, and administrative traditions and possibly the emergence of several functionally 
equivalent models to which groups of countries converge” (Knill and Lenschow 2005: 588). For 
example, each of the Scandinavian countries might share similar methods of EU policy 
implementation, and perhaps have a better record of policy implementation because their 
economic and political structural systems (corporatist/ social democratic parties) are more 
conducive to better environmental performance. These assumptions are tested and revisited in the 
second section of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2. Determinants of Environmental Performance 
The remaining section of this thesis is devoted to construction and analysis of the several 
independent variables that for both qualitative and quantitative purposes likely affect 
environmental performance variations among industrialized countries.  The first section states the 
expected relationships between the independent variables and environmental performance, the 
second section explains the operationalization of the independent variables, the third section 
presents the regression models and results, and the fourth section provides analysis of the variables 
and the regression results, followed by a summary and conclusions.  
Hypothesis 
The following section develops and tests the relationship between a number of independent 
variables and the dependent variable, environmental performance. Based on previous studies of 
environmental performance, I have developed five basic hypotheses: 
-Environmental performance (change in pollution levels over time) is determined by the 
wealth, in this case income as real GDP per capita, and/or economic growth of a given nation. One 
can reasonably assume that as wealth and growth increases environmental performance increases. 
Alternatively, however, economic growth may be due to an increase in industrial output and/or an 
increase in consumption, which may actually lead to poorer environmental performance. Based on 
previous studies, however, we would expect to find a positive relationship between income and 
environmental performance as well as economic growth and environmental performance for the 17 
industrialized countries considered in this study.  
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-Geographic and physical variables such as population density and land area affect not only 
starting pollution levels, but also reduction of pollution levels over time. Greater population density 
may lead to improvement in environmental performance because more people are noticeably 
affected by pollution levels and other environmental problems. Oppositely, countries with a large 
land area may be able to distribute pollution so that it is less concentrated and therefore less 
noticeable and seem less problematic to large amounts of the population. It is expected that 
countries with large land area and small population density, such as Canada, would have 
comparatively poorer environmental performance than countries with small land area and large 
population density, such as the Netherlands.   
-Institutional arrangements may impact environmental performance due to the fact that 
they determine who has access to and influence over both policy creation and policy 
implementation. Specifically it has been found in environmental performance studies by Jahn (1998) 
and Scruggs (1999, 2001, 2003) that neocorporatism has a significant positive effect on 
environmental performance. Based on previous studies, as well as the fact that countries such as 
Switzerland, Sweden, and Germany have very high aggregate environmental performance in this 
study, we would expect that corporatist institutional structures contribute to better environmental 
performance. 
-Percentage of left parties in government, including social democrats and any other part to 
the left of the spectrum, such as green parties, influences environmental performance. One would 
expect that countries with a larger average of left parties in government during the period from 
1970 to 2005 would have better environmental performance. However, many studies have made 
the argument that social democratic ideology may resist environmental ideology. Studies by 
Neumayer (2003) and Jahn (1998) found that where green parties have access to the legislative 
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process environmental performance definitely improves, whereas the relationship is less clear with 
social democratic parties, or left parties in general, which is the measure used in this study. 
-Constitution of political institutions may affect environmental outcomes. This paper in 
particular looks at constitutional structure or veto structure, which is a measure of dispersion of 
political power combining political institutional elements such as federalism, presidentialism, 
bicameralism, and popular referenda (Huber and Stephens 2001: 55-56). Because a greater number 
of veto points would likely make the passage of environmental policy legislation more difficult, one 
would expect that that countries with a high constitutional structure score would have poorer 
environmental performance. Similarly, one would also expect to find better environmental 
performance among countries with lower electoral thresholds, allowing for easier access to policy 
making by a number of different parties, and countries with frequent coalition governments.  
Operationalization 
The data for the dependent variable, environmental performance, is an aggregate 
environmental score for the years 1970 to 2005 for each individual country in the study and is based 
on the formulas in Scruggs (2003) Sustaining Abundance and is discussed in the first section of this 
paper. The data for the independent variable, income, comes from the Penn World Table 6.2 and is 
the real GDP per capita (rgdpch) for each country at the outset of the period (1970), calculated in 
thousands of dollars (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2006).The data for the independent variable 
economic growth comes from the Penn World Table 6.2 and is calculated based on the change in 
real GDP per capita over the thirty-five year period 1970 to 2004 (Heston, et al. 2006).   
The data for the independent variable population density comes from the United Nations 
(2006) publication Population, Resources, Environment and Development: The 2005 revision. I 
created an average population density variable based on the average of population density between 
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1970 and 2005. The data for the independent variable of land area is taken directly from Scruggs 
Sustaining Abundance: Environmental Performance in Industrialized Democracies (2003: 74). Scruggs 
data is based on a 1991 Penn World Table publication in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. To 
account for the extreme comparative size of Canada and the United States to the other countries in 
the study, Scruggs computes a natural log of land area (lnkm
2
) to create the variable. Geographic 
advantage is calculated based on the combination of the standardized average population density 
variable, which comes from the average population density calculated for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
and  2005, and the inverse log of land area (km
2
) (United Nations 2006, Scruggs 2003: 74). The 
variable is meant to indicate the combined effects of population size and land area, since both 
arguably contribute to environmental performance.  
The variable for corporatism is based on Siaroff’s “integration” value. It comes from the 
Armingeon, Gerber, Leimgruber, and Beyeler (2008) Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2006 and is 
an average of the integration (corporatism scores) for the years 1980, 1990, and 2000. According to 
Scruggs, “Siaroffs’ [variable] attempts to rectify several problems that exist in categorizations used 
in the corporatist literature…his categorization focuses more on the general functional and 
behavioral elements of corporatism…[and] takes into account changes in corporatism after the mid-
1980s” (2003: 155). Furthermore, I do not use the other measures of corporatism included in 
Scruggs’ 2003 study on environmental performance because Lembruch’s (1980) measure of 
corportist concertation is dated for my purposes and Lijphart’s (1999) indicator does not show 
change over time.  
 The variable for percentage of left parties in cabinet comes from the Comparative Political 
Data Set 1960-2006 and is the average from 1970 to 2005 of “cabinet composition—social 
democratic and other left parties in percentage of total cabinet posts weighted by days” 
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(Armingeon, et al. 2008: 3). The variable for veto structure comes directly from Scruggs Sustaining 
Abundance and is calculated based on a combination of variables that influence constitutional 
arrangements and veto points, such as federalism, bicamericalism, and executive dominance (2003: 
166). It is based on Huber and Stephens measure of constitutional structure (Huber and Stephens 
2001: 55-56). The variable for multiparty politics comes directly from Scruggs Sustaining Abundance 
as well and is the combined scores for frequency of coalition government and proportional 
representation (measured by electoral threshold) (2003: 166). According to Scruggs, “…both of 
these variables affect the likelihood of having environmental issues prominently represented within 
the chambers of political power” (2003: 183).  
Regression results 
Table 2 below displays the results of the regressions based on my five hypotheses. Model 1 
includes the variables for economic and geographic determinants of environmental performance, 
Model 2 includes the variables for labor market institutions as determinants of environmental 
performance, Model 3 includes the political parties variable, and Model 3 the political institutions 
variables. Models 5 and 6 represent the regression equations in which all variables in the previous 
regressions found to be statistically significant are included. The variables corporatism and left 
government are not included in the same regression models because they are too highly correlated. 
In Model 6 the left cabinet variable is statistically significant at a .1 level.  It was included in a further 
regression model, not shown below, with the other significant variables income and geographic 
advantage. In this model it was statistically significant at a .01 level.  However, in all the models, a 
high R
2
 indicates that the fit is good. The adjusted R
2
 is higher for the model including corporatism 
rather than left government. Model 7 is therefore seen as the best regression model for explaining 
variations in environmental performance.  Overall the regression results show that income, 
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geographic advantage, and corporatism best describe variations in environmental performance (R
2
: 
70).  
Table 2.1 Regression Results: Economic, Institutional, and Political variables and Environmental     
     Performance. 
 
Independent Variable Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Economic and 
Geographic Variables 
       
Income 36.48*    26.08** 34.61** 25.77** 
Economic  Growth 0.47       
Geographic Advantage 46.32**    28.89* 35.96* 23.84* 
        
Labor Market 
Institutions 
       
Corporatism  92.49***   85.56**  72.9*** 
        
Political Parties        
Left cabinet percentage   2.29ª   1.83  
        
Political Institutions        
Veto Structure    -14.8    
Multiparty Politics    -42.93* 14.83 -11.87  
        
Constant -14.15 62.18 293.6 371.02 -173.48 -34.1 -128.03 
Adjusted R
2 
.33 .58 .10 .20 .70 .46 .70 
Number of Cases 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
ªSignificant at p<.10 and retained in Model 6 
* p<.05   ** p<.01 ***p<.001 
Discussion of Variables and Results 
Economic and Geographic Variables 
Economic and structural explanations associated with environmental performance include, 
but are not exclusive to income level, economic growth, population density and land area.  The 
majority of the literature structured around environmental performance views the relationship 
between income and environmental performance as a U-shaped curve, or what has come to be 
known as the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). The curve is based on the idea that as countries’ 
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income per capita increases, they are likely to increase their levels of pollution to a certain point 
due, for example, to growth in heavy industry and/or to greater consumption. However, the curve 
reflects that as industrial growth levels off, or income levels reach a certain point, pollution actually 
decreases. The relationship assumes a number of previous or causal relationships are all reflected by 
the “per capita income” variable. For example, the relationship assumes that per capita income 
growth is based on a shift towards industrialization, and that certain political structures, as well as 
environmental and consumer values, are also in place during the shift. Similarly, the decline in 
pollution levels as income levels reach a certain point is often attributed to the post-industrial shift 
and to an emergence of values or greater interest in environmental issues.
6
  
Beyond its theoretic assumptions, the income variable causes a number of problems in the 
explanatory literature related to environmental performance. Scruggs and Neumeyer note that the 
real relationship between income and environmental performance may not be well explained by an 
aggregate dependent variable of environment performance, rather the relationship between 
income and environmental outcome may depend on the individual pollutant in question. For 
example, in 2003 Neumayer finds a linear income environmental performance relationship and that 
“a higher per capita economic output and greater per capita use of vehicles increase per capita 
pollution levels” (218). 
In the case of this particular study, the regression results from Table 2.1 suggest that there is 
a strong, statistically significant relationship between income and environmental performance. 
When combined with other significant variables in models 5, 6, and 7, income remains statistically 
significant at the .01 level. In this case we can say with much certainty that there is a strong positive 
relationship between income and environmental performance. Canada and the United States 
                                                          
6
 Scruggs tests for the effects of environmental values and environmental mobilization among populations in 
the countries of this study, but finds no significant relationship between values and mobilization and 
environmental performance (2003: 78-121). 
24 
 
remain the interesting outliers, whose higher GDPs clearly do not correlate to better environmental 
performance.  In the case of Canada and the United States, other political and geographic factors 
may be better indicators of environmental performance than income.  In fact, if Canada and the 
United States are dropped, the data shows an even stronger linear relationship between income and 
positive environmental performance outcomes: in a first order correlation between income and the 
aggregate environmental performance score, the correlation coefficient is .81.  
The next relationship investigated in this study is the effect of economic growth on 
environmental performance. While the literature discussed thus far has paid attention 
predominantly to the effect of certain structural variables on environmental performance, it is often 
suggested in both scholarly literature and in political debate that environmental policy negatively 
affects environmental growth. The idea behind the negative relationship is that certain 
environmental policies and practices would naturally predicate a reduction in certain manufacturing 
and industrial practices that have high pollution rates. The relationship thus suggests that in order to 
ensure better environmental outcomes there must be a trade off in economic growth. If this is 
indeed the case then the interests of participants in institutional arrangements such as corporatist 
systems, and some political parties such as social democratic, might view themselves as negatively 
affected by environmental policy, and therefore they might be less inclined to be responsive to 
environmentalist concerns, “some observers of this development have concluded that this creates a 
new social cleavage between productionism and environmentalism” (Jahn 1998: 108). 
Does environmental policy slow economic growth which in turn produces better 
environmental performance? In fact, the data in this study shows that there is no clear relationship 
between economic growth and environmental performance. In the regression model 1 economic 
growth is not statistically significant, and in a simple correlation equation the correlation coefficient 
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between economic growth and environmental performance is extremely small (-.12). It is fair to 
mention that the correlation is negative, which may lend a small amount of support to the argument 
that economic growth negatively affects environmental performance. However, again when the two 
outliers, the United States and Canada are dropped from the dataset, the correlation becomes even 
smaller (-.0629) suggesting that there really is no relationship between economic growth and 
environmental performance among industrialized democracies.  
The lack of relationship produced by the results is in fact extremely significant for the 
environmental movement and proponents of environmental policy. If there is, indeed, no 
relationship between growth and performance, then it is not a clear disincentive for governments, 
businesses, or trade unions to support and implement environmental policy. It should also be noted 
that this lack of relationship has been supported by other studies. Neilson, Pedersen, and Sorensen 
indicate that while there may be slowed economic growth due to a “shift toward greener 
preferences,” this shift has a positive effect on levels of unemployment (1995: 186).  
  Population density and land size reflect more static variables that have a likely impact on 
environmental performance but are not easily altered by public motivation or governmental policy.  
Population density and land size affects environmental performance in two ways. First, pollution 
problems are likely to be more obvious to the public and to governments of densely populated 
regions, for example people living in the UK might be more aware of levels of green house gases or 
more susceptible to water contamination by fertilizer usage, than people living in the United States. 
And second, government action to solve pollution problems is more likely due to the pressure from 
the public, as well as the difficultly in finding alternative options. For example, in the United States 
or Canada, waste generation may be less problematic as there is more space for landfills, versus 
countries such as the UK and the Netherlands that have very small land mass and may be required 
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to make more drastic efforts to reduce consumption and promote consumer recycling. However, 
where land size and population sufficiently explain the weaker performance of Canada and the US, 
geographic advantage does not so clearly explain the better performance of the larger Scandinavian 
countries such as Sweden and Norway.  
In this study, land size and population density are combined into one variable, geographic 
advantage. The regression results show a strong positive relationship between geographic 
advantage and environmental performance.  In general, large land size and low population density 
should predict poorer environmental performance, while small land size and high population density 
should predict better environmental performance. This is because greater land area has a negative 
impact on environmental performance, where as higher population density is positively associated 
with environmental performance.  The graph below does a lot to describe the relationship between 
geographic advantage and environmental performance.  The United States and Canada all have 
larger land area and are less densely populated, and they all have lower overall environmental 
performance scores. On the other hand, the Netherlands is very densely populated, 300 people per 
km
2
 versus Canada’s 3 people per km
2
, and has very high environmental performance. In the middle 
however, you find a mixture of countries, where geographic advantage may not best explain 
environmental performance. For example, Sweden is relatively large and relatively sparsely 
populated, and yet has very high environmental performance.  In this case the Swedish corporatist 
structure, discussed below, probably does more to predict Sweden’s environmental performance 
than its geographic advantage (or lack thereof).  
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Fig 2.1 Twoway scatter plot of environmental performance from 1970 to 2005 and individual 
country scores for geographic advantage 
 
 
As mentioned above, the relationship between income and structure of economy and 
environmental performance assumes that the income variable represents a number of relationships 
that have already combined together, such as social institutions and government policy to affect 
income growth.  If this is the case, however, “if social institutions and policy play a role in the 
determination of economic development, it seems logical to expect that they will play a role in 
determining environmental outcomes” (Scruggs 2001: 64). Thus, the next two sections of this thesis 
are devoted to the institutional and political variables that are potential determinants of variations 
in environmental performance. 
Labor Market Institutions and Environmental Performance 
Corporatism and pluralism reflect two distinctly different types of arrangements between 
economic and policy actors which could potentially determine effectiveness of environmental 
performance. Historically, however, cross national studies comparing and contrasting corporatist 
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and pluralist systems have often, in regards to environmental performance, noted that while policy 
outputs and implementation methods may differ between the two institutional structures, the 
environmental performance outcomes, for example reduction of air pollutant emission, have often 
been similar. That is, both have tended to see results from the production and implementation of 
environmental policy, regardless of whether the policy was created in a more antagonistic pluralist 
fashion, or a more consensual or cooperative corporatist fashion (Scruggs 2003: 127). More 
recently, however, comparative literature has strongly suggested the corporatist arrangements may 
be more likely to result in positive environmental performance (Crepaz 1995, Scruggs 1999, 2001, 
2003, Jahn 1998), while other studies (Armingeon 2008, Neumayer  2003) find corporatism to have a 
statistically insignificant effect on environmental performance. With so much controversy,  it seems 
relevant to investigate once more not only whether corporatism does indeed indicate better 
environmental performance (the second segment of this portion), but also why it is an important 
and relevant indicator of environmental performance in general. 
Institutional arrangements reflect the interplay between those who are most likely to be 
negatively affected by environmental legislation (large/ heavy industry and businesses) and 
environmental interest groups, government, and the general public.  In both corporatist and 
pluralist institutional structures, there are reasons to expect that businesses, trade unions, and 
industry may be wary of environmental policy implementation. The most obvious reasons being that 
environmental regulation has often been associated with job loss and slowed economic growth, and 
also because environmental regulations mean incorporating changes into the already extant 
structures and systems. Alternatively, this paper finds that there is no clear relationship between 
economic growth and environmental performance. And Scruggs points out that the “myth” of a 
trade off between environmental improvement and economic growth and job creation has actually 
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remained more strongly emphasized in countries with pluralistic arrangements, such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, rather than countries with more corporatist type structures.  
While, as stated, there are reasons to theoretically think that corporatism would not be 
compatible with environmental regulation, there are a number of logical and practical reasons that 
corporatism might facilitate more environmental regulations and therefore better environmental 
performance, which are exemplified by the real-life examples of countries such as Sweden, 
Denmark, and Germany. Proponents of corporatism suggest that the system is more able to deal 
with problems of collective action and free-riding. In a more corporatist style system there is 
typically some compensation for losers during adjustments that are the result of (environmental) 
regulations; as well as incentive to share information, which arguably makes business more 
accepting of policy and regulation, and incentive for technological innovations that would allow 
businesses to seek out ways in which to benefit from regulations, rather than to avoid them. Scruggs 
argues that while corporatism is interested in economic benefits, it is strictly because these 
economic benefits are often seen as the root of other social benefits. Therefore, while the economy 
remains a top priority, corporatist institutions have always had high incentive to incorporate 
demands for the public good such as “health, safety, and environmental reforms” (Scruggs 2003: 
138). Where job loss in relationship to environmental regulations is concerned, Scruggs notes that 
environmentalism was used to create jobs as well as to encourage technological innovations, while 
Nielsen, et al (1995) find that environmental regulations are associated with reduction not inflation 
of voluntary unemployment.   
The results of this study show that strong corporatist systems are highly positive related to 
better environmental performance, with statistical significance at the .001 level (Model 7). This is 
consistent with Scruggs (1999, 2001, 2003) and Jahn (1998) who find corporatism also to be 
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statistically significant. The relationship between corporatism and environmental performance may 
explain why a country such as Switzerland, which has the same veto structure as the United States 
(discussed below), has comparatively better environmental performance. The divergence among 
countries, especially EU countries, in overall performance, could likely be attributed to differences in 
corporatist structures as well. EU countries with more corporatist structures such as Germany, 
Sweden, and Switzerland scored high on overall environmental performance, whereas countries 
with weak corporatism such as the UK and France score more moderately.  
Left Government, Veto Structure, and Multiparty Politics 
Political structures are, of course, likely to affect both environmental policy outputs and 
environmental performance outcomes. Political structures determine who has access to policy 
making and therefore what interests are articulated at legislative levels. They also determine the 
ease or difficulty in passing environmental legislature. The political segment of this study is divided 
into looking first at whether the ideological orientation of a given cabinet in a political system affects 
environmental outcomes, and then at looking at the political structure itself,  in terms of whether 
structural issues such as veto points and electoral threshold, federalism and bicameralism, 
determine better (or poorer) environmental performance. 
Typically parties associated with more environmentally friendly behavior are parties on the 
left of the spectrum. Logically, of course, green parties are the parties with ecological values at the 
very top of their platforms which would most support positive environmental performance. Green 
parties are typically based on principles of environmentalism, as well as social justice and pacifism. 
They have typically been anti-nuclear power, a stance most clearly evidenced by the German green 
party and the fact that Germany energy policy has remained staunchly anti-nuclear since.  Often 
where electoral threshold is high or larger parties dominate green party votes shift to left parties 
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such as social democrats. Thus it would seem that left parties, such as social-democratic parties, 
tend also to be more environmentally friendly. However the quantitative data to support this claim 
is somewhat mixed, and  of course (theoretically) there are reasons to think that social democratic 
type parties might not be consistently supportive of environmental policy, despite evidence that 
“more successful political mobilization of environmental demands has usually been part of a wider 
left-wing political agenda” (Neumayer 2003: 205).  
The reasons that social democratic and left parties do not typify parties that would support 
environmental policy and environmental movements has to do with the perceived threat of 
environmental policy legislation on economic growth and especially employment, which is at the 
center of the left party agenda. As discussed earlier, academic studies and political literature have 
suggested that adoption of best environmental practices can potentially cause a decline in economic 
growth, due to the regulations placed on the industrial manufacturing sector, although this 
argument is not supported by evidence in this study. 
  On the other hand, there are many reasons to think that social democratic parties would be 
aligning themselves with environmental policy issues. The first and most obvious would be in order 
to gain electoral support, which would otherwise go to challenging green parties. Furthermore, 
Neumeyer remarks that “as left-wing parties tend to be more interventionist in their economic 
policy making they might find it easier to accept that governments need to install environmental 
protection instruments such as command-and-control, environmental taxes or tradable pollution 
permits, in order to correct market failures” (2003: 204). In a similar respect, Scruggs notes that left 
parties, despite having concern for employment and growth, which could be counter productive to 
environmental performance, have always put social welfare concerns and quality of life at the top of 
their priorities, two important variables which are directly influenced by environmental outcomes. 
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Interestingly enough, several studies find that when social democrats are in opposition, they tend to 
mobilize more for environmental policy rather than when they are the majority government. This 
has to do with the fact that while environmental issues have gained attention from social 
democratic parties, other party priorities may remain higher, “social democratic parties are 
traditionally oriented toward questions of redistribution, state intervention, and welfare states;” 
and that it may be easier to push unfavorable legislation when in opposition and at less of a threat 
of losing face, than while in the majority (Armingeon 2008: 18).  
  The results in Model 3 show that the percentage of left seats in government over the period 
1970 to 2007 has a positive influence on better environmental performance. Sweden who had 
almost 100 percent left government in cabinet over the period, also experienced very high 
environmental performance, where again the two low performers, the US and Canada had no left 
governments in cabinet during the same time period.  The relatively low adjusted R
2
 in both Model 
3, Model 6 and a non-include regression Model 8, suggest that while left government may be a 
significant variable, it does not sufficiently explain environmental performance.  Left government is 
also very highly correlated with corporatism, exemplified by countries such as Sweden, and in the 
case of this study, the models indicate the relationship between corporatism and environmental 
performance actually explains more than the relationship between left government and variations 
in environmental performance. The first order correlation between left government and 
performance is .40, the first order between corporatism and performance is a much more 
convincing .78.  
It is important, however, to consider not only the effect of left governments on 
environmental performance, but the political structure factors that might also determine the types 
of political parties that have access to policy making as well as the ease of creating and passing 
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environmental legislation. For example, constitutional structures such as bicameralism, federalism, 
executive dominance, electoral threshold, and frequency of coalition governments may all influence 
the way in which legislation is created and implemented and therefore may positively or negatively 
affect environmental outcomes.  
The variable for multiparty politics is the combination of the frequency of coalition 
government and electoral threshold. Neumayer’s 2003 study confirms consistently that the 
presence of green parties influences positive environmental performance. This is significant in so far 
as a green party has access to the legislative process. Clearly, having a green party in legislation 
would increase chances of bringing environmental policy to the forefront of the political agenda, as 
the environment is the main concern of green parties. However, in many systems smaller political 
parties do not have access to the legislative process due to electoral threshold, the number of votes 
a new party is required to achieve in order to enter into the political arena, or dominance of 
legislature by a single party. Where green parties may enter into the political arena easily, there may 
be a faster response to environmental demands, where as “where laws favor big parties—such as 
the United States—the process of responding to new environmental demands [can be] subsequently 
delayed” (Neumayer 2003: 204).  In this case the measure for electoral threshold, or for 
proportionality, comes from Lijphart 1994 and is the “effective percentage of the vote a party needs 
for representation” (Scruggs 2003: 177). A country with a high electoral threshold, would have a 
smaller degree of proportional representation, and therefore increase not only the difficulty of new 
parties entering into politics, but the difficulty of representing diffuse interests such as 
environmental issues. This variable is logically linked together with the frequency of single party 
versus coalition systems. Obviously, a lower electoral threshold would lead toward multiparty 
politics and therefore greater frequency of coalitions.  
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In the case of single party versus coalition systems, where single party systems tend to limit 
the number of interests that are encompassed and reflected by their ideological platform, a 
coalition government, which is composed of a number of different parties, tends to be 
representative of a number of different ideologies and interests. Therefore, in theory, smaller 
parties such as environmental parties would have a much greater chance at affecting environmental 
legislation in a coalition government than in a single party dominated government. This has been 
the case in Germany, where “the necessity of a coalition government has provided the Green Party 
with extensive access to and influence over environmental policy among the German Lander” 
(Scruggs 2003: 164). While Germany remains a case in which a coalition government has clearly 
aided in the uptake of environmental issues, other countries such as Sweden and Norway, which 
have comparatively high environmental performance, are “run by single parties more than two 
thirds of the time”  (Scruggs 2003: 166-167). The United States, however, reflects a case in which 
green parties have little or no access to policy making and the dominant parties clearly have little 
incentive for allowing the articulation of their interests through their party platforms. The result has 
been weaker comparative environmental performance.  
In the regression Model 4, multiparty politics is shown to be statistically significant at the .05 
level, although the low R
2
 suggest that neither multiparty politics nor veto structure does much to 
explain environmental performance.  Nevertheless, there is the expected negative relationship 
between the multiparty politics variable and environmental performance, which suggest that 
perhaps higher frequency of coalition government and lower electoral threshold are somewhat 
more conducive to better environmental policy. When multiparty politics is entered into regression 
Model 5 and 6, however, it loses statistical significance, suggesting that issues such as income, 
geographic advantage, corporatism, and frequency of left party government do much more to 
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describe variations in environmental performance, than institutional factors such as electoral 
threshold and single party versus coalition governments. 
The final variable in this study, veto structure, brings together three different elements of 
the structure of political institution: bicameralism, federalism, and executive dominance. Each 
contributes to how unified or separated a country’s government is.  In the case of bicamerialism, the 
existence of a (strong) second chamber would suggest more dispersed political power, where as a 
weak or non-existent second chamber (unicamerial system) would imply more unified government. 
Similarly, the presence of a strong and independent executive would also suggest more dispersion of 
powers, whereas a weaker executive would suggest that they power rested more solely or heavily in 
the legislature. Finally, federalism measures the dispersion of powers between the central 
government and sub-governments. In this case “the critical issue is whether it is better to have 
multiple avenues of possible representation for environmental interests or centralized channels” 
(Scruggs 2003: 172). Countries with strong federalist systems have a large geographic dispersion of 
powers to sub-governments, countries such as the United Kingdom who have unified governments 
have little or no dispersion of powers. 
On the one hand a less unified or more dispersed political system may provide a number of 
avenues in which to put forth policy and legislation, as well as the guarantee that once this 
legislation is passed it cannot be easily overturned. This type of situation typifies a government with 
a strong veto structure, or more dispersed political power, such as the United States and 
Switzerland. On the other hand, a more unified system may be more effective at integrating, 
adopting, passing, and implementing environmental issues because of a lack of veto points 
(dispersion) and therefore a smaller change of encountering “political deadlock” (Scruggs 2003: 
168). Scruggs finds some evidence to support the claim that unified governments have better 
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environmental performance than countries with separation of powers such as the United States, 
France, and Switzerland when looking at each of the components of veto structure individually. This 
is not surprising as, in general, “political scientists have suggested that the concentration of power 
better enables democratic regimes to regulate powerful interests in the public interests than does 
and arrangement providing for more balance between branches or levels of government” (Scruggs 
2001: 189). In this case, unified government may be more apt at representing diffuse interests 
(interests where individual costs and benefits are seen as very low) than more dispersed 
governments. 
However, like Scruggs, my data suggests that there is no relationship between veto 
structure and environmental performance (in a first order correlation between veto structure and 
the aggregate environmental performance score the correlation coefficient is -.06). This evidence 
may suggest that both systems have their own pros and cons in terms of interest articulation and 
legislative policy making. Smaller comparative country studies, such as one noted by Scruggs 
between the United States and the Sweden, show differences in the process of creating and 
implementing environmental legislation during the 1980s, but similar outcomes in terms of pollution 
reduction (2003: 127). In section one, when discussing convergence, I suggested that the divergence 
among the countries of the European Union and in general all of the countries in this study, could 
possibly be described by differences in political institutions. However, as shown by the lack of 
significance of the veto structure variable, it is unlikely that the composition of political institutions, 
or the dispersion of political power, affects outcomes in environmental performance. In this case, 
then, we would not expect differences in political structure to be standing in the way of EU 
harmonization policy or to be causing divergence among the EU member states. It is possible then to 
consider that the evidence presented shows an absence of convergence due to time frame—not 
enough years of tough EU environmental policy have passed to indicate convergence—and that the 
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study could be revisited and conducted in another five years, to include data up to 2010, which 
might yield different results.  
Conclusion  
The results of the regression models above find income, geographic advantage, and 
corporatism to be the variables which best explain variation in environmental performance.  The 
study has attempted to account for variations in environmental performance by investigating a 
number of possible casual effects such as percentage of left parties in government, economic 
growth, and political structures such as veto points and electoral threshold. Furthermore, it has also 
attempted to account for variation by using the most recently available data in both the dependent 
and independent variables.   
Income and geographic advantage are not variables which are likely to change over time, 
making it difficult to approach them as elements which help countries develop better environmental 
performance. While it can be pointed out to Canada and the United States that their large land 
areas increase emissions due to greater transportation lengths, and increase waste generation and 
decrease likelihood of recycling measures due to availability of landfills for waste disposal, the 
proposed solution cannot be to decrease their land size or increase their population density. 
However, it can be understood from the relationship that some countries are at a geographic 
advantage or likewise disadvantage from the beginning of the period, while other elements such as 
corporatism and frequency of left government may explain why over time some countries improve 
upon their environmental performance and others do not. For example, large land area and 
therefore relatively longer transportation routes are a likely cause of higher SOx emissions and NOx 
emissions in the United States and Canada. Pluralist institutional structures and lack of left 
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government influence may explain why over time emissions levels have not decreased as drastically 
as in countries such as Sweden, that have large land size as well.  
Neo-corporatism as it is defined today is a flexible model used to explain the involvement of 
different interest group actors in government policy making. As Molina and Rhodes explain, since 
the 1970s, understandings and definitions of corporatism have shifted slightly from “analysis [of] 
tripartite relations between labor, business, and the state…” to “…the emergence of new forms of 
neo-corporatist decision making in the postindustrial policy arenas of education, health care, 
welfare and environmentalism” (2002: 309). As evidenced by this study, as well as by Scruggs (1999, 
2001, 2003) and Jahn (1998), the neo-corporatist style of consensual policy making has clearly had a 
positive influence in the area of environmental performance. If we understand neo-corporatism in a 
more broad form, rather than its early solely economic form, we can see that “consensus seeking, 
extensive involvement of major groups at the policy making stages, and shared responsibility by 
associations of regulated actors in the outcomes of government policy may be conducive to 
effective environmental policies independent of economic policy” (Scruggs 2003: 211). Therefore, 
governments with more pluralist or less corporatist structures can seek to solve environmental 
problems through more corporatist-like arrangements, without suggesting that these countries 
overhaul their economic arrangements and institutional structures and adopt neocorporatist 
models.  
This thesis provided a broad view of the relationship of a number of different economic, 
political, and institutional variables to environmental performance.  Ideally a future study would 
look at the subset of data from 1995 to 2005 to more accurately describe the relationship of the EU 
to environmental performance, as well as point out more recent changes to overall trends in 
environmental performance. In a study of the subset of data I would hope to find greater 
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convergence in environmental performance among EU member states. I would expect many of the 
relationships between environmental performance to remain the same, especially those which are 
static such as population density, land area, and even income. While others may decrease in 
influence, such as political structures that are seemingly inimical to environmental improvement  
due to the influence of European Union environmental policy as well as deepening of global 
environmental policy.  
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